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Abstract. The point of this article is that critical philosophical reflection  is vital to human liberation. 
This sort of philosophy reveals the fundamental (or radical) connection between human action and any 
resulting reality.  In this way, realism is undermined, including any claims that try to diminish utopian 
thought.  New, more humane social imagery and embodied ethics can be proposed that elevate in importance 
the communal character of social life.
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Introduction
Although not especially welcomed, radi-
calism has been a part of the history of social 
and political thought. Between the calls for 
better or more rigorous empirical analyses 
and a public sociology, a so-called radi-
cal tradition has survived. But throughout 
this history, a nagging question has existed 
just below the surface of claims and coun-
terclaims. Specifically, who is radical? Con-
servatives are not likely to be considered too 
radical, but how about Marxists?
Probably most social critics would agree 
with Enrique Dussel that functionalists are 
not radical. After all, they are realists who 
seek order, stability, and control. Roles, 
structures, and equilibrium, for example, 
are their focus of attention. Additionally, 
they view change to be unduly disruptive 
and strive to provide an adequate answer to 
the Hobbesian problem of order.1 Function-
alists conclude their analysis by describing 
society to be an all-encompassing regulatory 
system. 
Although the stability or stasis sought by 
functionalists is not likely coveted by radi-
cals, but what about change? In this context, 
terms such as rebellion and revolution are 
regularly used. To be a radical often requires 
or at least suggests a commitment to disrupt, 
or perhaps overthrow the status quo. And at 
1 Parsons, Talcott. 1951. The Social System.  Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
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least in the case of Marxists, a rejection of 
capitalism is involved. Others might reject 
patriarchy or racism.
But is change, even in so-called progres-
sive movements, necessarily radical? Yet the 
issue at this juncture is not the content but 
the mechanism of change. What if this proc-
ess, for example, is evolutionary and persons 
are merely capable of responding to social 
or cultural conditions? As a result, they do 
not necessarily choose the direction or rate 
of change, and may be overwhelmed by any 
results. Clearly Marxists have experienced 
this nasty turn of events. In the end, change 
becomes a juggernaut that swamps and 
contravenes the intent and general aims of 
the majority of persons. For example, often 
governments are established that violate the 
basic principles of a movement.
At this point of where praxis enters the 
picture.2 Consistent with the writing of 
Marx, this capacity is identified with the 
eventual liberation of persons, particularly 
those who are poor or marginalized in other 
ways. These groups may or may not be the 
proletariat. Nonetheless, human liberation 
is often tied to the exercise of this creative 
ability of persons to remake themselves , 
their social conditions, and the future.
In this discussion of liberation, praxis is 
typically differentiated from theory. Praxis, 
indeed, is action. But is true action the prod-
uct of material or other autonomous forces? 
In this regard, praxis seems to be diluted 
if this action is the result of causal factors. 
In such a situation, persons choose neither 
the course of action nor the outcome. Such 
action can hardly be considered liberating, 
if persons are simply the pawns of history. 
To paraphrase Marx, they are condemned 
to make history within pre-established pa-
rameters and ends.3 What is so radical about 
this prospect?
In his inimitable manner, Dussel argues 
that liberation must be radical. He notes 
that libratory action must be uncondi-
tioned and free to envision and implement 
real alternatives.4 Rather than simply being 
against something, such as a repressive re-
gime, those who liberate create a new real-
ity. True liberation is thus not a reaction but 
action, while simultaneously unmasking the 
limitations that have been imposed on this 
freedom.5
Clearly radicalism is something weighty. 
But what philosophical maneuvers are pre-
supposed by this notion? Marx once wrote, 
in well-known passages, that radicals go to 
the core of a matter and do not simply inter-
pret the world. But does this claim demand 
a new style of philosophy? Presumably both 
philosophers and other agents of change 
must begin to think in a profound way that 
is very different from the past, if their ac-
tions are going to be radical.
2 Dussel, Enrique. 1985. Philosophy of Liberation.  Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, p. 15.
3 Marx, Karl. 1963. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.  NY: International Publishers, p. 15.
4 Dussel, Enrique. 1977. Introducción a una Filosofía de la Liberación.  México, DF: Editorial Extemporá-
neos, p. 69.
5 Feagin, Joe R. and Hernán Vera. 2001. Liberation Sociology.  Boulder, CO; Westview Press.
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What is Radicalism?
The key issue is that radicals want to 
transform the world; they do not want to 
repeat the past or ruminate on the future. 
In this sense, they are neither determinists 
nor dreamers. The possibility exists, in other 
words, for them to act freely and construct 
an entirely new social order. Accordingly, 
radicals are utopians, in that protest and a 
fresh start are thought to be possible.
Radicals nowadays declare that another 
world is both needed and possible. The 
point, these critics assume, is that a clean 
break can be make with the past. Without 
necessarily supplying a myriad of details, 
the idea is that persons can join together 
in novel and supportive ways and create a 
more just and humane world. The exact na-
ture of these innovative relationships is not 
specified, probably for good reasons. Why 
define a priori the dimensions of human ac-
tion and initiative?
But again to borrow from Marx, the as-
sumption is that repressive institutions will 
be abolished. Coercive or exploitive relations 
will be replaced by the free and creative as-
sociation of persons. The resulting social 
order—presumably one that is collective—
will not be imposed on persons by history, 
material forces, or the dictatorship of any-
one. That is, social reality is not granted the 
autonomy indicative alienation, and thus 
cannot begin to dominate the citizenry.
Therefore, in order to be radical, action 
must be special, even that viewed ostensi-
bly to be progressive.  The exercise of praxis, 
in short, is radical only when the scope of 
human action is both self-created and self-
imposed by persons. More modern writers, 
such as existentialists, might say that such 
action is authentic, or undertaken with-
out guarantees or final explanations. Those 
who are authentic have the courage, as Paul 
Tillich describes, to invent themselves in a 
world that does not necessarily reward such 
audacity.6 Such invention defies the prevail-
ing claims about necessity and rigid order.
Marx addressed this matter when he de-
clared that radical, derived from the Latin 
radix, means to go to the root of some-
thing.7 And as he goes on to say, the root 
of everything is man and thus praxis. Such 
radicalism, suggests Marx, leads to hu-
manism, since human action is the center 
of social life. But in this case, humanity is 
not some generic foundation, such as God, 
Spirit, or nature. As Marx recognized, lib-
eration would not arrive by simply turning 
the vision of Hegel upside down. In short, 
Marx was not announcing that he is a real-
ist. A naturalistic realism would not advance 
much beyond the idealism of Hegel; in nei-
ther example would humans control or de-
fine their nature or destiny.
At the root of history, for example, are 
persons who do not merely carry the past 
6 Tillich, Paul. 1952. The Courage to Be.  New Haven: Yale University Press.
7 Marx, Karl. 1967. “Toward the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction” (p. 257), in Writing 
of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, edited by Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat.  NY: Anchor 
Books, pp. 249-264.
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forward but invent this entire trajectory. 
Hence humans are the base of all other re-
alities. Even under the worst of conditions, 
noted Marx, repressive institutions are based 
on the labor of those who are suppressed. 
Much later, Bourdieu tries to capture this 
sentiment when he declares that persons are 
regularly complicit in their own suppres-
sion.8 They “misrecognize” their relationship 
to the products of their labor. The praxis of 
the past, through the efforts of a very sophis-
ticated ideological apparatus, is transformed 
into something foreign that entraps persons 
and convinces them that they have no au-
thority. Their association with every facet of 
reality is thus inauthentic. As Sartre might 
say, they exist in a state of “bad faith”, since 
they deny and subvert their agency.9
Radical action, therefore, is predicated 
on a very unique element. Specifically, a style 
of reflection is present that reveals praxis to 
be at the core of reality, thereby preventing 
the products of this action from becoming 
autonomous. The institutions that persons 
invent, accordingly, are understood to be 
devoid of necessity and can be modified or 
discarded at any time. The resulting reality 
is authentic because persons are aware that 
they are responsible for this creation; their 
praxis is revealed to even legitimize their 
tormentors. The removal of these odious 
characters or unresponsive institutions may 
be difficult, but they are not sustained by 
the usual metaphysical claims, such as Di-
vine Right or structural requirements.
In effect, radical action subverts the du-
alism that has been the cornerstone of most 
of the Western intellectual tradition. No 
longer, for example, is the One, Good, or 
the True, the standard bases of reality, se-
questered from the activity of humans. Cor-
respondingly, personal or collective identi-
ties are not tied to equally imperturbable 
foundations. Now praxis is uninhibited by 
these referents and can enact any number of 
social worlds. In short, no level of reality is 
independent of and escapes unscathed from 
human intervention.
Radical action is obviously liberating 
because persons lose their illusions about 
the urgency of reality and any inherent lim-
its imposed on social relationships. In the 
end, any restrictions are the consequence of 
and sanctioned by human action, even the 
mores formerly thought to be an outgrowth 
of nature of divine revelation. There is no 
space available, accordingly, to harbor the 
excuses that have been invoked traditionally 
to sustain reality. Due to radical action, with 
apologies to Sartre, persons are condemned 
to behave in an authentic manner and trans-
form open possibility (and not potentiality) 
into a reality.
The old bromide that some change or 
social arrangement has never existed in 
history, and thus is impossible, is mean-
ingless within this framework. Consistent 
with Marx’s favorite maxim that nothing 
is foreign to him is the realization that his-
tory does nothing; indeed, history follows 
8 Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice.  Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 117-118.
9 Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1964. Being and Nothingness.  NY: The Citadel Press, p. 449.
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the path cleared by human action. Persons, 
therefore, are free to alter human nature and 
travel where history has never gone before. 
There is nothing outside, behind, or under 
praxis that can restrict inherently this ac-
tion. As Roland Barthes announced in a 
different context, there is no other side of 
writing or praxis that defines and channels 
this process.10
Radicals face an abyss and make history 
even when they choose not to act. But the 
impression can be created that institutions 
demand conformity and persons must re-
lent to the reality woven by these modes of 
expression. As Marx once described, past la-
bor can begin to weigh on the spirit of per-
sons under specific social conditions. Nev-
ertheless, these situations are not natural or 
part of some cosmic scheme. The sad aspect 
of alienation is that persons often decide 
not to take the steps that would remedy this 
malady, because they believe that their role 
in promoting change is irrelevant or muted 
by more powerful forces.
New and Liberating Social Imagery
But the question that remains to be asked 
is: How does radicalism prevent the estab-
lishment of inhumane or repressive social 
conditions? A central element of contempo-
rary radical action is that social order should 
reflect solidarity, instead of internecine rival-
ries and exploitation. What would be gained 
if radical change did not extend beyond the 
present unsavory situation?
As Sartre pointed out in his book Anti-
Semite and Jew, those who want to exploit 
others engage in “first philosophy.”11 Those 
who want to marginalize or dominate per-
sons or groups cannot justify these plans 
with reference simply to personal whims, 
opinions, or ambitions alone. Such dire ac-
tions require a much sounder and more pro-
found source of legitimacy. Therefore, those 
who colonize others invoke regularly some 
universal in order to explain their proposals. 
Usually they engage in essentialism, where-
by those who are dominated are determined 
to deserve this treatment because of their 
biological or cultural inferiority.
This maneuver eliminates any contin-
gency from the process of exploitation. The 
aim is to conceal the politics of racism, for 
example, behind the cloak of principles that 
are allegedly not historical. And given the 
range of disparities among persons, contend 
racists, persons do not deserve equal treat-
ment. Within the context of this application 
of first philosophy, racial discrimination is 
only logical. After all, the best persons de-
serve special treatment and favorable social 
placements. 
But radical action destroys the facade 
of legitimacy provided by such philosophy. 
Stated simply, the a-historical character of 
essentialism is undermined by radicalism. 
Because all realities are mediated thorough-
10 Barthes, Roland. 1977. Image-Text-Music.  NY: Hill and Wang, p. 30.
11 Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1969. Anti-Semite and Jew.  NY: Schocken.  See also Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, 
p. 170.
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ly by human praxis, all universals are trans-
formed into particulars that are granted a 
special status. As described by Alfred Schutz, 
a specific option, through various means, 
including the use of power, begins to repre-
sent a paramount reality.12 Nonetheless, this 
exalted position is completely arbitrary and 
cannot be treated reasonably as inherently 
universal. Such an ideal is universal only 
within a unique network of praxis.
In this sense, radical reflection is linked 
to liberation. Marx appreciated this associa-
tion when he stated that philosophy is the 
head of any true revolution. Social move-
ments, accordingly, are radical when they 
strive to fulfill their desires rather than 
merely confront so-called political realities. 
Radicals are not this pragmatic.
But how does this radicalism affect the 
conceptualization of social life? Typically 
domination is encouraged by the models 
that are adopted to describe social order. 
The resulting control, however, is not neces-
sarily envisioned to be overt and intrusive. 
Because these strategies are predicated on 
realism, a centered image of society is ad-
vanced. This imagery, accordingly, estab-
lishes the conditions favorable to domina-
tion and justifies subtly and rationally the 
accompanying hierarchies.
How does the centered image of society 
operate? Usually some sort of unrestricted 
foundation is introduced to coordinate the 
various segments of society. At times this 
base has been referred to as a reality sui 
generis, while others have opted for the term 
system.13 In either case, the claim is that a 
universal and often idealized source is avail-
able to organize society.
Problems begin to arise when all persons 
are expected to adjust to this standard. This 
centered imagery, in fact, establishes what 
might be called the metaphysics of assimila-
tion, which persons must use to judge their 
character and behavior. In reality, this meth-
od of adjustment constitutes another form 
of first philosophy, because a dominant 
norm is revealed that is granted the latitude 
to envelop and overshadow all others.
The standard that is introduced by this 
model is given a seigniorial status. All per-
sons, accordingly, must internalize these 
norms if they are going to be integrated ef-
fectively into society. But then the question 
becomes, what standards should be adopt-
ed? What often occurs is that those who can 
illustrate that they most closely represent 
these ideals, often through chicanery or 
coercion, begin to embody the paragon of 
beauty, intelligence, or morality.
In the United States, for example, Eu-
ropeans were able to shape the discourse 
about these and other facets of social life. 
Paul Gilroy argues that these particular 
qualities were simply dressed up as univer-
sals and imposed on everyone without any 
reservations.14 Furthermore, those who 
most closely approximated these traits have 
been considered regularly superior to others 
and worthy of emulation. In point of fact, 
12 Schutz, Alfred. 1962. Collected Papersa. Vol. I. The Hague: Nijhoff, pp. 226ff.
13 Durkheim, Emile. 1983. Pragmatism and Sociology.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 86-88.
14 Gilroy, Paul. 1993. The Black Atlantic.  London: Verso, p. 190.
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in order to assimilate successfully to these 
standards, persons have often changed eve-
rything about themselves from their names 
to their skin color to achieve social mobility 
and widespread acceptance.
But as is discussed earlier, radicalism un-
dercuts all forms of first philosophy. Radi-
cals, accordingly, are not impressed by the 
claims of assimilationists that some charac-
teristics are naturally more desirable than 
others and should be employed to judge all 
persons.  The reason behind this rejection 
of assimilation is quite simple: no standard 
exists sui generis and has the status to iden-
tify superior groups or social classes. All that 
exists are various options that must be rec-
onciled. 
Indeed, radicals propose that society is 
centerless. Of course attempts can be made 
to coordinate the resulting diversity, but 
natural universals are not available to ac-
complish this task. For this reason, differ-
ent imagery has been proposed to describe 
the resulting reality, such as the collage, rhi-
zome, salad bar, and quilt. The point con-
veyed by each one is that a society can be 
integrated without an a-historical center or 
cosmopolitan vision through the direct and 
flexible relationship established through the 
recognition of diversity.
Often this rendition of order is called 
radical multiculturalism. While going be-
yond pluralism, these radicals contend that 
society consists of nothing more than con-
trasts and differences. In other words, there 
is no foundational norm and simply ac-
ceptable variations on this basic or central 
theme.15 All that exists, instead, is a multi-
plicity of perspectives, mores, or standards 
and the accompanying comparisons. And as 
these multiculturalists are fond of saying, a 
rational and just society respects these dif-
ferences, and thus does not subordinate any 
one to the others.
The resulting social order is certainly 
de-centered. Rather than coordinated by a 
single referent, differences are juxtaposed 
and sutured together, so to speak, at their 
boarders to form a coherent but multivalent 
unit. Lyotard calls this outcome concatena-
tion, whereby a flat organization of the parts 
of any phenomenon is established, includ-
ing society.16 These links are substantial, 
variegated, and extend in many directions 
simultaneously.
But these relations are not simply exter-
nal, as if persons exist simply side-by-side 
like objects. Persons, instead, are connect-
ed because of their experience of sharing a 
common domain and dwelling together. 
Their fields of experience crisscross and 
form a multivalent but unified picture. As 
portrayed by Merleau-Ponty, due to the 
overlapping of their paths, gazes, and inten-
tions, the lives of persons are illustrated to 
be thoroughly enmeshed.17 
Nestor Garcia Canclini refers to such so-
cieties as hybrid, because their integration 
15 Schlesinger, Arthur. 1993. The Disuniting of America.  NY: W.W. Norton.
16 Lyotard, Jean-Francois. 1988. The Differend.  Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 66.
17 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. The Visible and Invisible. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968.
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does not sacrifice complexity and diversi-
ty.18 Their integration, stated differently, is 
more lateral than vertical.
For example, according to Canclini, 
Latin America had little choice but to be 
a hybrid. After all, the colonial enterprise 
failed miserably, but not before dividing the 
region in many ways.
 On the other hand, Carlos Fuentes re-
marks that this part of the globe has always 
been baroque, or a mixture of very diverse 
elements.19 But this condition is common 
subsequent to the demise of first philoso-
phy, with the metaphysics of assimilation 
discredited. In view of this significant reo-
rientation, why should any culture accept a 
subordinate position? Without an absolute 
foundation, their relationships must be ne-
gotiated instead of specified in advance. And 
persons are not knowingly going to negoti-
ate their marginalization or exclusion from 
society. Instead, persons navigate a field of 
diverse others who, in fact, complement and 
enrich one other. An interesting mosaic is 
thus created that is only enhanced, rather 
than threatened, by increasing diversity.
Ethics without a Center
At this juncture is where ethics enters 
the picture. Clearly something must guide 
the negotiation process whereby behavioral 
expectations are established. Nonetheless, 
ethical principles cannot assume their usual 
ethereal form associated with first philoso-
phy.
When supported by this philoso-
phy, ethics is based on a set of universal 
rules or axioms that evaluate and direct 
behavior.20Traditionally this ground of 
ethics has been linked to divine or natural 
laws, behavioral imperatives, or psychologi-
cal propensities. The general theme is that 
an exalted system is present to regulate per-
sonal choices. But gradually this reliable 
foundation begins to conceal the world and 
subvert the mundane yet real character of 
ethical demands.21 
The first message conveyed to everyone is 
that ethics is a personal affair. In order to act 
ethically, persons have to merely internalize 
the rules of ethical behavior. Conformity to 
these standards is sufficient to insure that a 
person acts appropriately in one context or 
another.
A second, but correlative, theme is that 
persons are not necessarily responsible for 
one another. How others live is their con-
cern, although the expectation is that they 
will abide by the universal rules of morality. 
But whether or not they do so is not their 
neighbors’ concern. At best, any transgres-
sions are dealt with by an impersonal legal 
system.
In the end, society is a fairly lonely place. 
Persons pursue their personal salvation and 
assume that their neighbors are on a similar 
18  Canclini, Nestor Garcia. 1995. Hybrid Cultures.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
19 Fuentes, Carlos. 1992. El Espejo Enterrado.  México, DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
20  Ben Simpson, Christopher. 2009. Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern.  Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, pp. 13-14.
21 Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, p. 57.
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course. And along the way, persons try to 
insure that they have a clear conscience. But 
no-one has any obligation to intervene in the 
lives of others, in order to provide assistance. 
In fact, such involvement is often thought 
to curtail the freedom of everyone, although 
limited charity is deemed acceptable.
Gradually persons begin to assume that 
morality is derived from something other-
worldly, perhaps inspired by God or some 
esoteric insight.22 And in everyday life they 
pursue their respective goals and try to sur-
vive, while hoping they make the ethically 
correct choices within the confines of the 
available options. How they might intervene 
and change the course of events, in order to 
create a more just world, is not necessarily 
part of this scenario. Typically such collec-
tive responsibility and possible widely scat-
tered disruption is not linked to personal 
salvation.
But in the absence of first philosophy, 
persons do not have recourse to such ab-
stract and ultimately valid rules. Accord-
ingly, instead of looking inward or upward 
for advice, they must begin to realize that 
morality is discovered in the direct encoun-
ters between persons. Persons do not respect 
the rule of law, says Dussel, but others and 
their desire for a productive existence.23 
Furthermore, part of this realization is that 
they share an existential space and a com-
mon fate. Rather than following idiosyn-
cratic trajectories, persons are, in reality, 
part of an expansive community and rise or 
fall together. Persons who are marginalized, 
for example, do not disappear but haunt the 
community with logistical concerns, service 
demands, and moral questions.
Marx says that persons are involved 
fundamentally in sensuous relationships, 
although these are eclipsed regularly in the 
modern industrial world. This critique is 
aimed at the perspective on liberal individu-
alism offered by Locke and the accompany-
ing social indifference and fragmentation. 
Accordingly, he writes that a vital part of 
human nature is the collective character of 
social existence: “human nature is the true 
community of men”.24 The “species-life” of 
persons, in other words, is a result of the “es-
sential bond” that exists between persons, 
prior to the alienation that has been culti-
vated by capitalism.
The operative principle is that when per-
sons are not distracted by abstractions, such 
as moral imperatives, they will become at-
tuned to and understand their fundamen-
tal ties to others and act in concert with 
them. Hence their obligation is not simply 
to themselves, and possibly their families, 
but to preserve the integrity of everyone. 
As a member of a community, nothing less 
would be expected! Morality, accordingly, is 
not merely personal or abstract but primor-
dially collective.
Although insightful, Marx’s description 
of collectivity sounds somewhat organic 
22 Buber, Martin. 1965. The Knowledge of Man.  NY: Harper and Row, pp. 89-109.
23 Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, p. 59.
24 Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick. 1975. Collected Works. Vol. 3. NY: International Publishers, 
pp. 216-217.
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and devoid of praxis.  At this point is where 
the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas becomes 
important. His central idea is that ethics 
precedes ontology.25 What he means is that 
persons encounter one another long before 
they invent abstract moral principles to 
guide or justify their interaction. As a result, 
a different approach to morality emerges 
from this new social imagery. In contrast to 
first philosophy, the message is that persons 
are contingent and unmistakably related to 
one another—a relationship he calls face-to-
face—and thus none has the status or right 
to dominate others. Accordingly, mutual 
consultation and support are expected in 
order to maintain the implied solidarity.
This approach to cooperation is different 
from discourse ethics, which has gathered a 
following nowadays.26 Two points are par-
ticularly noteworthy. First, persons are not 
originally separate and must somehow be 
united. Therefore, the sacrifice of personal 
autonomy is not a prerequisite for exhibit-
ing social responsibility. And second, the 
barriers to non-repressive interaction—such 
as poverty or racism—are readily acknowl-
edged, and thus discourse is not imagined 
to occur in an idealized realm. Establish-
ing social solidarity, accordingly, does not 
encounter obstacles that render illogical or 
futile such an undertaking. In other words, 
because community ties are not unnatural, 
as is the case in discourse ethics, an equita-
ble and supportive order is well within the 
grasp of persons.
Through discourse ethics, for example, 
persons are thought to reach agreement or 
consensus and are eventually brought to-
gether. Furthermore, this process enables 
them to resolve satisfactorily disagreements. 
But presupposed by this process is a funda-
mental connection between persons. And if 
discord were placed in this network of com-
munity, many social problems would be 
viewed in a very different and more produc-
tive manner, and may not arise in the first 
place. For example, against this backdrop of 
solidarity, ethnic strife would not appear so 
natural or inevitable. Community, accord-
ingly, is more radical than the dialogue envi-
sioned by those who advocate discourse eth-
ics, because togetherness is not sought but is 
a part of everyone’s existence.
In such a community, there are no ac-
ceptable excuses for exploitation or other 
forms of marginalization. Persons are re-
sponsible for others and obligated to at-
tack and remove any barriers to their inclu-
sion. In actuality, persons are not drawn to 
an abstract community, but to those who 
comprise daily life. But in many ways such 
responsibility is more demanding than ab-
stract causes, since an immediate response 
to the difficulties of others is required. Al-
though moral lessons are valuable, care and 
action are essential.
In this regard, Gustavo Gutiérrez declares 
that liberation is a communal matter related 
to opening the basic institutions of a society 
to everyone, even those in the popular or 
25 Levinas, Emmanuel. 1969. Totality and Infinity.  Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, pp. 206-207.
26 Habermas, Jürge. 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action.  Cambridge: Polity Press.
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lower classes.27 Such a transformation, he 
believes, requires that persons insert them-
selves into the core of history and give the 
world a new direction. Persons must remain 
faithful to others and adopt a collective 
orientation.  Using the words of Marx, he 
goes so far as to say that persons should opt 
for the collective means of production. His 
point is that the masses of persons are not 
necessarily or automatically at the whims of 
those who deny regularly the feasibility of 
collective responsibility, and likely benefit 
from any discord.
What he calls the “self-creation” of 
humans thus becomes the focus of atten-
tion. Without a doubt, Gutiérrez believes 
that liberation is a radical and prophetic 
act, whereby persons leap collectively into 
an unknown but humanly created future. 
However, as a radical act, this movement is 
not eschatological but propelled by collec-
tive and worldly aims that persons bring to 
fruition through their thoughts and labor. 
There is no hidden or overt telos that under-
pins this process and controls the course of 
history. As Marx once declared, the real pas-
sions are responsible for any changes.
Conclusion
As a part of the various popular move-
ments around the world, many persons are 
unwilling nowadays to accept their tradi-
tional subordinate position. As exempli-
fied by the Zapatistas in Mexico, and the 
Piqueteros in Argentina, indigenous resi-
dents are demanding freedom and dignity. 
Their aim is no longer to integrate or as-
similate, but to redefine the social order. 
Similarly Subcommandante Marcos argues 
that rather than acquire power in a corrupt 
system, the purpose of radical action is to 
redefine politics. But central to this change 
is a new definition of collective life.
At this time, many radicals eschew the 
traditional understanding of the collective 
as state control or ownership. Such an ab-
straction or totality, again, sets the state for 
domination, since the question of equitable 
integration is bypassed. If the state, and thus 
the collective, constitutes a reality sui generis, 
persons must subordinate themselves to this 
force.  Consequently, they lose their unique-
ness and freedom, not to mention the face-
to-face association identified by Levinas as 
basic to ethics.
As might be expected, in the absence 
of first philosophy, such an organizational 
strategy is unwarranted. In the words of 
Dussel, the collective is no longer a fetish or 
divine.28 And thus in many ways socialism 
is dead, but the collective, in the form of 
interpersonal solidarity, is still very impor-
tant. Only now, instead of an abstraction, 
the collective represents different actors, 
coming from diverse angles, who support 
and protect one another. Such a commu-
nity is enacted between persons, rather than 
imposed from above or below. Additionally, 
the bond between persons is their dignity 
and mutual recognition and support. And as 
a corollary, their goal is the establishment of 
27  Gutiérrez, Gustavo. 1973. A Theology of Liberation.  Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, p. 151.
28  Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, p. 95.
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equitable relationships that reflect this direct 
and balanced link between persons. The only 
universal that is present is an inter-subjective 
awareness of and accessibility to others. 
Such an image of society, Dussel main-
tains, is a real utopia.29 Others are recognized 
not as absolute others, but as co-conspira-
tors in the development and maintenance of 
a new reality. And rather than simply surviv-
ing in a bankrupt system, persons are in the 
service of one another so that each lives well. 
In fact, says Dussel, the ethos of liberation 
requires this reinvention of order without 
the aid of the old metaphysical props, or 
first philosophy, so that the creative activi-
ties of citizens are not inhibited in advance. 
Now persons are expected to remake the 
world together, without the imperatives that 
in the past separated them and dictated be-
forehand who should benefit most from any 
changes. Clearly seeking such advantages 
contravenes the communal basis of persons 
and the process of co-creation that is essen-
tial to reduce internecine rivalries and the 
related social conflicts.
Within this context, liberation is signifi-
cantly different from how this idea is often 
conceived. The focus is no longer simply un-
limited freedom, personal autonomy, or the 
satisfaction of personal needs or ambitions, 
often referred to nowadays as self-actualiza-
tion or self-promotion. Accordingly, others 
are no longer irrelevant or an impediment to 
individual growth. Now that all persons are 
understood to share a common fate, libera-
tion occurs within this societal framework. 
And any compromise of the implied diver-
sity should not be a part of this activity.
What liberation represents is the op-
portunity for persons to create a world30, as 
Pablo Richard says, where “everyone fits.” 
Through mutual consultation, persons can 
establish inclusive institutions that encour-
age the full participation of all sectors of 
society and insure no-one is left behind. 
And as a result of such robust intervention, 
persons can produce the outcomes they de-
sire. The actual nature of these ends is un-
clear, but they should reflect the solidarity 
witnessed in the process of their creation. 
Societal goals, in other words, reflect the 
collective spirit of persons.  In this regard, 
liberation does not represent an escape from 
social responsibility but rather enables per-
sons to act in a socially conscious manner 
and become fully human.
29 Ibid., p. 66.
30 Richard, Pablo, Interview, San José, Costa Rica, March 15, 2009.
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Pagrindinis šio straipsnio argumentas yra tas, kad kritinė filosofinė refleksija yra esminė žmogaus laisvės 
prielaida. Šioji filosofinė paskata atveria kertinį, arba radikalų, ryšį tarp žmogaus veiksmo ir įgyvendinamos 
tikrovės. Šitaip apribojamas realizmas, įskaitant ir pastangas suvaržyti utopinę mintį. O kartu išlaisvinama 
žmogaus vaizduotė ir įkūnytoji etika, perteikianti bendruomeninį socialinio gyvenimo pobūdį.
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